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Abstract
The certainty of judgment (or self-confidence) has been traditionally studied in relation with the accuracy. However, from an
observer’s viewpoint, certainty may be more closely related to the consistency of judgment than to its accuracy: consistent
judgments are objectively certain in the sense that any external observer can rely on these judgments to happen. The
regions of certain vs. uncertain judgment were determined in a categorical rating experiment. The participants rated the
size of visual objects on a 5-point scale. There was no feedback so that there were no constraints of accuracy. Individual data
was examined, and the ratings were characterized by their frequency distributions (or categories). The main result was that
the individual categories always presented a core of certainty where judgment was totally consistent, and large peripheries
where judgment was inconsistent. In addition, the geometry of cores and boundaries exhibited several phenomena
compatible with the literature on visual categorical judgment. The ubiquitous presence of cores in absence of accuracy
constraints provided insights about objective certainty that may complement the literature on subjective certainty (self-
confidence) and the accuracy of judgment.
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Introduction
Certainty in judgment of size
When we describe the size of an object by means of words like
‘small’, ‘large’, ‘huge’, we may be more or less certain about the size
and/or about the word to use. Certainty is a key factor when
different courses of action stem from judgment. For instance
suppose we want to grasp a stone. If we judge that it is ‘tiny’, we
will pick it with two fingers, we will use one hand if it looks
‘medium-sized’ and two hands if it looks ‘large’. If our judgment is
certain, we may act immediately. Otherwise, we may inspect the
stone more carefully, take more time to consider, and eventually
use a trial-and-error strategy.
In one of its meanings, Certainty is subjective. Feeling certain means
‘‘firmly believing, having no doubts’’ [1]. Subjective certainty (or
self-confidence) is an individual feeling about our own judgment. In
laboratory experiments, self-confidence may be expressed or rated
post-hoc [2]. There is no straightforward relationship between self-
confidence and accuracy. In fact, for general knowledge tasks, the
relationship is inverse (hard-easy effect), although feedback may
reduce this mismatch [3]. Errors may affect self-confidence in
different ways. It was proposed that Brunswikian errors (lack of
knowledge) elicit over-confidence in cognitive judgment and
Thurstonian errors (perceptual noise) under-confidence in percep-
tual judgment [4]. However, this dichotomy has been experimen-
tally challenged [5]. In categorical judgment, confidence depends
on the categories, natural vs. artificial [6]. Conversely, the lack of
confidence increases the gradedness of the responses thus the
observed categories look less crisp [6]. The lack of straightforward
relationship between self-confidence and the judgment itself is not
surprising, given the existence of an epistemological gap: judgment
is observable whereas self-confidence, like consciousness is an
individual state of mind, unreachable by observation.
However, in another of its meanings, certainty is objective.
Something certain means ‘‘something that you can rely on to happen’’
[1]. For instance, the phases of the moon and the tides are
objectively certain. Objective certainty depends on the phenom-
enon and/or its causes, not on the observer. In the case of
judgment, objective certainty is not the subjective feeling of the
judge: it is the certainty shared by external observers that a
judgment will occur under given circumstances. Objective
certainty of judgment is thus directly determined by its
predictability and its repeatability, i.e., under the same circumstanc-
es, the judgment will be the same. In real life, repeatability may
remain an abstraction. However, in laboratory experiments, the
observable equivalent of repeatability is the consistency (i.e.,
‘‘something that always happens in the same way’’ [1]).
Consistency is a graded variable that can be measured as soon
as judgment is reproduced in ‘‘identical circumstances’’. We can
thus determine objective certainty experimentally, as absolute
consistency.
This led us to design an experiment to study the consistency of
judgment. Because objective certainty, like subjective certainty, is
independent from truth and/or accuracy, we studied consistency
independently from accuracy, i.e., in a task in which there were no
accuracy constraints. Stimuli of different size were presented
repetitively and the participant rated their size on a discrete scale.
There was no good or bad response thus there was no feedback.
Our interest was objective certainty of individual judgment therefore
we processed the data individually. Subsuming the ratings of
participants would only have given insights on the certainty of
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votes, public opinion and related issues.
This experiment differed from previous studies about certainty
in several aspects. First, it studied objective certainty independent
of accuracy, whereas the literature is centered on confidence
(subjective certainty) and accuracy. Our characterization of
certainty was also novel. We first characterized consistency by
means of the frequency distributions of the ratings. Then we
determined cores of certainty, i.e. regions of absolutely consistent
ratings, and regions of inconsistent ratings called peripheries. This
dichotomy provided a simple representation of the geometry of
certainty. Finally, we tried to identify in cores and boundaries
classical results in perceptual judgment (see next subsection). Note
that in the literature on judgment, consistency is generally
considered an outcome rather than an object of study (although
the tendency to be consistent is sometimes considered an
explanatory factor [7]). In contrast, is this experiment consistency
is the dependent variable that allows us to establish maps of
absolute certainty. The factors that may affect consistency are
viewed as controlled or random parameters.
Categorical visual judgment
The experiment presented here is a categorical visual judgment task.
The rationale is to map some physical feature (in a broad sense) into
a discrete scale of ratings. This is a particular case of perceptual
rating. In a commonly accepted view, perceptual rating is the
combination of two mappings. 1) A noisy perception process [8,9]
transforms perceived features (in a broad sense) into subjective
magnitudes, in a covert psychological space. 2) Subjective
magnitudes are transformed into ratings. When the perceived
feature is mono-dimensional, it is possible to establish a rating curve
(also called psychophysical mapping) between stimuli and ratings. The
rating curve follows a power law with an exponent close to one for a
variety of stimuli and rating modalities [10] including 2D-computer
objects [11] like those used in our study.
In categorical judgment, there are fewer ratings than stimuli
(otherwise, the task is called absolute identification). The compound
effect of noisy perception and the reduction of dimension between
stimuli and ratings is indeterminism, i.e., the relationship is not one-to-
one. Each rating corresponds to distributions of intensities whose
centers are on the rating curve. For instance, a simulation of the
categorical judgment model of [12] shows that the category of a
rating has a central plateau (a core) surrounded by peripheries in
which the frequency of the rating decreases. As the dispersion of the
perceptual noise increases, the peripheries extend and the core
disappears. However, simple models and simulations should at best
be interpreted as metaphors, and the reality is far more complex.
Anchoring effects tend to make judgment more consistent at the
extremity of the range of stimuli than in the center [13,14].
Conversely, Bow effects make judgment inconsistent and slow in the
center of the range [15]. The typicality of the stimuli (representative
of their rating or not) affects reaction times [16,17]. Also, the
connotation of the labels of the scale may ‘distort’ judgment
[18,19,20].Finally, severalresults challenge the view that judgments
can be repeated ‘‘in identical circumstances’’. The set of stimuli, the
order of presentation, the rating scale and the feedback may affect
judgment (frequency effects, [21], primacy effects [7], assimilation and
contrast effects [22,23]). In the study of consistency, these factors have
to be controlled or at least documented.
Categories, cores and peripheries
We characterize objective certainty as follows. We determine
the relative frequencies of the ratings ‘R1’‘ R 2’…‘ R n’ for each size
‘S’. We determine the category of each rating ‘R’ as the
distribution of relative frequencies of ‘R’. These distributions of
relative frequencies can be viewed as ‘likelihood’ functions, or
‘backwards probabilities’. However, for simplicity, we only use the
terms of ‘relative frequencies’ and ‘conditional probabilities’. Note
that the opposite representation is often encountered in the
literature about rating (i.e., the distribution of ratings for each
stimulus size). Both representations are in fact equivalent. The
distribution of ratings for a given stimulus size can be obtained
from the graphical representation of Figure 1 by drawing a vertical
line and measuring the height of the intersections with the
category of each rating. The support of a category is the set of
stimulus sizes that are rated ‘R’ at least once (Figure 1).The
support is divided into core and peripheries. The core is the set of sizes
where the relative frequency of ‘R’ is (almost) 1. In the cores,
judgment is absolutely consistent, i.e., objectively certain. The
peripheries are the remainder (Figure 1). The categories of the
ratings provide a global landscape of consistency in the stimulus
space, and cores and peripheries divide this landscape into discrete
regions of certainty/uncertainty.
Cores and peripheries are borrowed from the framework of
fuzzy sets [24,25] (see next section for details). They represent
additions to the classical statistical framework, so we need to justify
their introduction from the viewpoint of scientific parsimony. First,
the cores have no direct equivalent in descriptive statistics. The
shape of a distribution is usually characterized by its central
tendency and its higher order moments, such as the dispersion and
the skew, and these statistics do not tell anything about the
existence of a plateau, i.e., a core. Second, we use cores and
peripheries to characterize objective certainty i.e., absolute
consistency. Using descriptive statistics to describe absolute
consistency would have been possible, but unduly complicated.
Finally, the best justification of cores and peripheries has to be
experimental: these concepts should provide insights on the rating
of sizes that are in line with- but not a trivial consequence of- the
scientific literature.
Figure 1. Categories of ratings (idealized). Each rating R1 … R4
corresponds to a curve with a central core where the relative frequency
is 1, and peripheries where the relative frequency decreases towards 0
(the trapezoidal curves are only illustrative). Horizontal: Stimulus sizes.
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Formal definition of cores and peripheries
The Theory of Fuzzy Sets [24,25] was initially introduced to
model ill-defined (fuzzy) categories like ‘‘tall men’’ or ‘‘numbers
much greater than one’’. Whereas classical sets are binary (0: does
not belong to;1 :belongs to), fuzzy sets are analog: the degree of
membership can be graded between 0 and 1. The degree of
membership has a straightforward equivalent in the categorization
literature, namely the typicality of the exemplars of a category
[16,26,27]. Fuzzy sets can be interpreted in different ways, the
most common being possibility functions. Possibility functions are
similar to probabilities but are not mutually exclusive. For instance
a miniature car is a car and a toy, and for both categories the
degree of membership (possibility) is 1. For different interpreta-
tions of Fuzzy sets see [25,29,30].
Here, we use a probabilistic interpretation of fuzzy sets. We consider
the category of each rating ‘R’ as a fuzzy set, i.e. a membership
function mR defined on the space of sizes, and we identify
membership functions with conditional probabilities, i.e., mR (s) is
p(R|s), the conditional probability of rating ‘R’ given the stimulus
size ‘s’. The probabilistic interpretation of fuzzy sets offers two
major benefits: i) it is compatible with the probability theory, and
ii) we can obtain an experimental estimate of the membership
function mR as the relative frequencies of rating ‘R’. To do so, the
sequence of stimuli of an experiment is considered a random
sample. As the number of stimuli increases, the relative frequencies
converge towards the probability density function. This experi-
mental estimation is impossible with possibility functions [30]. In
the remainder of this paper, the term of ‘membership function’ will
designate the actual distributions of relative frequencies and/or the
ideal curves, i.e., the conditional probability density functions of
the ratings.
Definition of category, core and peripheries. The cores
and the peripheries are defined from a fuzzy operator known as
alpha-cut ([28], p. 19). The alpha-cut of a membership function mR
is the set of sizes for which the function is greater than or equal to
alpha. We define the support of a category of rating ‘R’ as the
interval between the extreme sizes where mR(s).0, the core as the
interval between the extreme sizes that compose the 1-cut, and the
peripheries as the difference between support and core.
These definitions deserve three comments. 1) Using intervals
(instead of the raw alpha-cuts) prevents scattering of the support
and the core (e.g., a random erroneous rating may split the core
and/or the support into two subintervals). 2) The interval-based
definition allows a simple 2-fold computation: first compute the
supports of all the ratings ‘R’ then compute the cores as the
intervals that belong to only one support. 3) In theory, these
definitions are sensitive to noise. For simplicity, we nonetheless
used them in the present study, but we verified a posteriori that
they were sufficient. A robust generalization of these definitions is
proposed in the Section Discussion.
Rationale of the task
Stimuli. The stimuli were disks presented in the central visual
field on a computer monitor (diameter between 1.7 mm and
54 mm, below 8u visual angle). We expected that the centers of
mass of the categories would be linearly spaced [11]. Disks were
preferred to mono-dimensional stimuli like bars because in
preliminary experiments, some participants reported a ‘trick’,
namely comparing mentally the bar with a labeled line
representing the scale.
Distribution of stimulus sizes. We used 64 stimulus sizes
(in the range of diameters 8–260 pixels, 4 pixels steps) so that: i) the
space of sizes could be considered a quasi-continuum in relation
with the number of ratings (five, see below); and, ii) it was possible
to present several times the same size within a reasonable amount
of time. The sizes followed a uniform density probability function,
so that frequency effects did not shift the categories [21] and that
sequence effects were decreased by averaging.
Rating scale. We used a 5-point scale because it is the
smallest number for which central and extreme categories have no
common peripheries. It provides three different configurations: 1)
extreme categories are anchored; 2) intermediary categories have a
common frontier with one extreme category and 3) the central
category is presumably free of direct interference from extreme
categories. Also, a 5-point scale is safely below the ‘‘magical
number seven’’ [31]. Above this (imprecise) limit, unwanted
phenomena may occur: some ratings may never be used, whereas
others may overlap completely.
Labels. The scale was labeled with letters A to E, in increasing
order of sizes, whereas the participants (Canadian university
students) were used to the reverse scale (academic marks, A being
the highest). In order to avoid confusions, a legend (upper left
corner) showed the largest and smallest possible circles tagged with
E and A respectively. This scale was suggested by participants of
preliminary experiments, when asked for the ‘‘less natural way of
rating sizes’’. We avoided numbers and intensity qualifiers for
which distortions have been previously reported [18,19]. Indeed,
even with these precautions, the semantics of the labels (in fact of
any type of labels) may have affected the geometry of the cores (see
Section Discussion).
Inter-trials eraser. Immediately before each stimulus, the
monitor displayed concentric circles in graded tones of grey (inter-
trial erasers have been previously used for auditory stimuli in [32]).
The eraser was used to discourage memory-based strategies in two
ways: i) ‘erase’ the visual memory of previous stimuli; ii) refresh the
memory of the range of sizes before each trial (the eraser was
slightly larger than the largest stimuli). The effectiveness of these
concentric circles was confirmed by participants in preliminary
experiments.
Preliminary training. The participants executed a practice
session with the same stimuli and a 3-point scale that lasted
typically 30 minutes. The objective was to expose the participants
to the entire distribution of stimulus sizes in order to control range
effects [21] and avoid primacy effects [22]. We used a 3-points scale so
that participants remained unexposed to the 5-points scale used for
the test. Note that even with these precautions, the training
probably affected the geometry of the cores (see Section
Discussion).
Remaining effects. The eraser did not eliminate sequence
effects based on memories of previous judgments (assimilation with
last judgment; contrast with recent judgments). We expected that
these effects would be decreased by averaging the data across
random, uniformly distributed sequences of stimuli. In addition,
the preliminary training itself may affect judgment, under the form
of ‘repisodic memories’ [33] (see Section Discussion).
Participants and procedure
Twenty healthy young volunteers (n=20, age=22.3 years,
s=1.7, 10 males, 1 left-handed), with no history of motor,
neurological or perceptual deficits, with normal or corrected vision
participated in this study. Participants gave written informed
consent in accordance with the code of ethics of the Institut
universitaire de ge ´riatrie de Montre ´al (certificate 2004-0301).
The stimuli were presented on a 15’’ LCD screen placed at
about 50 cm from the eyes. No head-support was used. The
experimenter verified the posture of the participant before each
Certainty Categorical Judgment
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variation of apparent size of the target caused by the head shifts
can be considered additional perceptual noise. A simple
geometrical model based on the distance eye-target with lateral
and axial head movement showed that the variation of visual angle
of the target was about 18% for 10 cm head displacement (lateral
and backwards), and 9% for 5 cm (which is typically the distance
that the assistant could detect).
The task was self-paced and executed with the mouse. After
clicking in a start point placed in the center of the screen, an inter-
stimulus eraser (concentric circles shaded from dark to white)
replaced the start point and remained visible for 0.5 s. The screen
was cleared during one second then the stimulus appeared at the
center of the screen as a blue disk, and five boxes containing letters
A to E appeared in the lower part of the screen. The participant
clicked on the desired letter. After selection, no feedback was
given, the screen was cleared and the start point appeared for the
next trial.
Using the mouse produced larger reaction times than keys and/
or buttons, but this method is safer. In preliminary experiments,
participants reported fewer self-detected errors (when they were
aware that they selected an unwanted category) than with keys,
presumably because the movement gave them additional time for
correction. According to Fitts’ Law [34], this entry method did not
bias the reaction time. Fitt’s law states that the time to reach a
target increases logarithmically with the ratio distance/diameter as
measured on a line that crosses the starting point and the target.
When the targets (the labels) are placed on a line, the ratio
distance/diameter remains constant whatever the angle, therefore
the predicted movement time is constant.
If the mouse left the start point before the stimulus appeared,
the trial was tagged ‘anticipated’. Anticipated trials were discarded
from the analysis of reaction time but were considered valid for
computing the distributions of relative frequencies.
Participants were instructed to click in the start point and to
keep the mouse at the same position until a blue disk appeared,
then to click on the letter that best described the size of the blue
disk as fast and accurately as possible. They were told that the
letters were ordered by increasing size, from A to E, and that the
disks could be any size between a dot and the size of the largest
circle of the inter-stimulus eraser.
First, participants went through a practice session of 192 trials (6
blocks of 32 trials) with 3 categories. Then they performed one
short practice session of 5 trials with 5 categories. After that, they
executed 10 blocks of 32 trials with 5 categories. There was a
pause (the duration was determined by the participant) after each
block. The whole session lasted about one and a half hours.
Data analysis
The controlled variable was the stimulus size s. The dependent
variables were the category number (1 … 5) and the reaction time
T (between the appearance of the stimulus and the click).
Anticipated trials (in which movement began before the
appearance of the disk) were considered valid for the computation
of the category c but they were discarded for calculating the
reaction time T.
Membership functions. For each Rating ‘R’, the
membership function mR (s) was estimated as the relative
frequency distribution, i.e., mR(s),fR(s)/ SR fR(s), where the
frequency distribution fR(s) is the number of stimuli of size s that
were rated R. The membership functions were determined with
two levels of granularity: size by size for determining the cores and
peripheries, and, for the figures, by bins of four consecutive sizes
(corresponding to 20 stimuli, on average). The membership
functions were determined based on the individual data for each
participant and the data for the group.
Cores and peripheries. The positions and the areas of cores
and peripheries were estimated for each participant and averaged
across the group. The support of each membership function mR
was first determined as the interval between the extreme
amplitudes where mR (s).0; the cores were determined as the
intervals pertaining to the support of only one category, and the
peripheries as the intervals pertaining to the support of two or
more categories.
Effect of region type on reaction time. A two-factor
ANOVA for Region Type (n=2, Periphery vs. Core) x Participant
(n=20, random factor) was conducted on reaction time T. The
trials for which movement was anticipated had previously been
removed (they represented less than 0.6% of the trials).
Verification of the method of computation of cores and
peripheries. The membership functions were examined post
hoc in order to verify whether this simple computation was
sufficient (recall that this method can misclassify scattered
fragments of the cores into the peripheries, see subsection
Formal Definition of Cores and Peripheries). We searched for
stimuli of the core (with relative frequency close to one) that were
erroneously placed in the peripheries.
Descriptive statistics on frequency distributions. For
each Participant and rating ‘R’, the position PR, dispersion DR, and
frequency FR of the category of rating ‘R’ were determined from
the frequency distribution fR(s) as the Mean, Standard deviation
and Number of samples, respectively. The linearity of the mapping
was measured by the correlation coefficient (Pearson r) between
the ranks of the ratings and the positions (PR), for each Participant
across Categories of ratings (n=5), and for the whole group across
the set of Participant x Category (n=100).
Results
Main findings
Shape of the categories. Figure 2 depicts the categories
(distributions of relative frequencies) for one participant and for
the group. The whole set of curves can be found at: http://
visualcategories.googlepages.com/. The group categories were
roughly bell-shaped, which is compatible with the predictions of a
Thurstonian model of absolute judgment, when the noise of the
discriminal processes is important (for group distributions, inter-
individual differences play the role of a noise). Recall that group
categories would only bring information about certainty of
collective judgment.
Individual categories presented cores and peripheries.
In contrast with the group categories, 94% of the individual
categories had a central plateau, i.e., a core (Figure 3.a). Only 3
cores out of 2065=100 categories were reduced to a single peak,
and 3 cores were missing (central category ‘C’ for one participant;
intermediate categories B’, ‘D’, for another participant).
Robustness of the method of computation of cores and
peripheries. None of the categories presented misclassification,
i.e., fragments of the cores erroneously classified in the peripheries.
This validated a posteriori the method used to compute the cores
and peripheries.
Cores and peripheries represented similar areas.
Figure 3 depicts the distributions of the positions and areas of
the cores and peripheries calculated separately for each
participant. Cores and peripheries had almost equivalent areas,
45.1% and 54.9% of the stimulus sizes, respectively (calculated by
averaging the areas of core and peripheries of each participant).
This difference is not significant (ANOVA with factor Core (1/0)
Certainty Categorical Judgment
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time, the peripheries pertained to two neighbor categories. Only
0.7% of the range of stimulus sizes pertained to three categories
(this means that some category is totally covered by the neighbor
categories).
The reaction time was longer in the peripheries than in the
cores. When the effects of Region type (Core vs. Periphery) and
Participant (random factor) on the Reaction Time were examined,
wefounda significanteffectofRegiontype,F(1,19)=15.6,p,.001.
The reaction time was about 20% longer in peripheries than in
cores (Figure 4). There were also a significant effect of Participant,
F(19, 19)=8.7, p,.0005, and a significant interaction for Region
type x Participant, F(19, 6322)=11.7, p,.0005.
Geometry of cores and boundaries
The positions of the cores were not linear. The
consecutive cores were not equidistant (Figure 3.b), as showed
by an ANOVA on the Distance between consecutive cores
(calculated from the center of mass of the cores) and factor
Category (n=4, the first category was not considered), F(3,
76)=3.9, p,.005. The pair of cores (‘A’–‘B’ and ‘D’–‘E’) were
closer than the pairs ‘B’–‘C’ and ‘C’–‘D’ (about 18% of the range
of size vs. about 26%, as shown by post hoc analyses; Dunnett T3).
However note that these quantitative estimates must be handled
with care, given that Levene’s test indicated non-homogeneous
variances for the variable Distance.
The area of the cores decreased along the scale. The
areas of the cores was relatively constant for categories ‘A’, ‘B’,
and ‘C’ (about 11.7% of the range of stimulus sizes) and
decreased for categories ‘D’, and ‘E’ (6.7%) (Figure 3.c). This
was confirmed by an ANOVA with the factor Category (n=5),
F(4, 95)=3.9, p,.005. Post hoc analyses (Dunnett T3; variance
was not homogeneous according to Levene’s test) showed that
the area was significantly higher for categories ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’
than for categories ‘D’, and ‘E’. The other differences were non-
significant.
The areas of the peripheries presented a bow effect. The
areas of the peripheries presented a marked bow effect, i.e., the
Figure 2. Categories of the ratings. Each category corresponds to a curve. Horizontal: stimulus size (diameter in pixels). Vertical: relative
frequency. a) One participant. Light gray: cores. Dark gray: peripheries. b) Whole group. Note: the cores of central categories are reduced to a single
peak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006198.g002
Figure 3. Positions and areas of cores and peripheries. Cores and peripheries are computed separately for each participant. a) Cores.
Horizontal: stimulus size (diameter in pixels). Vertical: participants. Note: for participants 1 & 10, some cores are missing. Thick horizontal bars: ‘average
core’ determined from the average position of the individual interval bounds. b) Position of the centers of the cores (average of the position of the
individual cores). Vertical bars: standard deviation. Vertical: stimulus sizes (diameter in pixels). Horizontal: categories. c) Areas of the cores and
peripheries (average of the individual areas). Common peripheries are counted twice, one for each neighbor category.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006198.g003
Certainty Categorical Judgment
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range of stimulus sizes) and minimal for extreme categories ‘A’
and ‘E’. The bow effect was confirmed by an ANOVA with the
factor Category (n=5), F(4, 95)=32.7, p,.0005. Post hoc
analyses (Dunnett T3; variance was not homogeneous according
to Levene’s test) showed that the areas of the extreme categories
(‘A’, ‘E’) were significantly lower than the areas of the
intermediary categories (‘B’, ‘D’), which in turn were
significantly lower than the area of the central category (‘C’).
There were also significant differences between the areas of the
extreme categories (‘A’,‘E’) and between the areas of the
intermediary categories (‘B’,‘D’).
Unlike the cores, the positions of the entire distributions
of relative frequencies were linear. When the entire
distributions of relative frequencies were considered, the
categories were linearly spaced, i.e., the positions of the centers
of mass of the distributions of relative frequencies were equidistant
in the range of stimulus sizes (Figure 5). This was confirmed by the
high correlation coefficient obtained for individual categories
(r=0.989, n=100, i.e., 20 participants 65 categories, p,.01).
This result is compatible with the literature, but it also means that
the peripheries occulted the non-linearity of the positions of the
core.
The rating curve was almost linear, indistinguishable
from a power law. As a consequence of the former result, the
rating curve (extrapolated from the centers of mass of the
distributions of relative frequencies of the ratings) was almost
linear. However, with only five points, correlation coefficients
obtained with linear and power functions are virtually
indistinguishable. Therefore the rating curves are compatible
with the power law with an exponent close to one consistently
reported in the literature.
Figure 4. Effect of region on reaction time. Vertical: reaction time in
milliseconds. Horizontal: peripheries vs. cores. Thick bars: Mean reaction
time, determined for the whole group. Thin bars: standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006198.g004
Figure 5. Descriptive statistics of the categories of the ratings. From left to right: 1) position (center of mass), 2) dispersion (standard deviation),
3) frequency of the rating (across all stimulus sizes). Horizontal: categories. Vertical: stimulus size (diameter in pixels) for position and dispersion, number
of stimuli for frequency. A: One participant. B: Whole group. Scatter plots, each dot represents a Category x Participant combination.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006198.g005
Certainty Categorical Judgment
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Cores were ubiquitous
The individual categories of the ratings almost always presented
a core. We can reasonably conclude that the presence of the cores
reflect a real phenomenon, namely the existence of a region of
consistent individual judgment for each rating. Several factors
support the view that the cores were not experimental artifacts. i)
The definition of the cores and the computation method were
minimalist and required no arbitrary thresholds and/or param-
eters. ii) The task was not particularly easy (so that the presence of
cores would have been mandatory), or at least it is more difficult
than classical discrimination tasks using two categories. iii) The
consistency of judgment was not manipulated by any type of
feedback. The preliminary training with a 3-point scale indeed
provided repisodic memories (subsumed memories of sequences of
episodes) that may have facilitated (or biased) categorical
judgments [33]. However, all the categories of the 5-point scale
had cores, even those that were absent from the 3-point scale.
Finally, the significant difference in reaction time between cores
and peripheries indicates a difference in the judgment process,
probably due to competing decisions in the peripheries [17].
Indeed, this could be explained only in terms of consistency, but
this also shows that the dichotomy cores-peripheries is not
unrealistic.
Wide peripheries
The peripheries represented about half of the range of stimulus
sizes (54%). This may result from several experimental factors. i)
The small inter-stimulus spacing increased the effects of perception
noise. ii) The mono-dimensional, artificial stimuli may be more
difficult to classify (i.e., choose between concurrent ratings) than
familiar, multidimensional stimuli like faces, which produce
relatively crisp categories [35]. iii) The lack of feedback and the
self-determined categories may difficult classification. This is has to
be contrasted with the crisp frontiers obtained when categories are
perceptual, i.e., direct outcome of perception, like phonemes [36],
and when the feedback is designed to increase the discrimination
at the periphery [37].
Peripheries vs. number of categories?
A remarkable fact is that during the training with a 3-point
scale, the peripheries represented 27% of the range of sizes, vs.
54% in the experiment. Although we cannot compare quantita-
tively training and task, it is remarkable that the area of the
peripheries was roughly proportional to the number of frontiers (3-
point scale: 2 frontiers, 27%; 5-point scale: 4 frontiers, 54%). This
provides a working hypothesis for future research, namely that
until information processing limitations occur, the width of the
peripheries in categorical judgment is coarsely constant.
Unexpected geometry of certainty
The first unexpected result is that the area of the cores
decreased along the scale. The most likely explanation is the
perceptual noise: the imprecision on the subjective magnitude of
visual stimuli (the ‘noise’) is roughly proportional to the stimulus
size [10]. This imprecision makes the ratings increasingly
inconsistent as their size increases, which ‘erodes’ the cores more
and more towards the upper extremity of the scale. A second
unexpected result was the non-linear placement of the cores,
which appeared to be closer from the extremities of the scale than
expected. This may result from anchoring effects: the imprecision
is different at the two extremities of a core (lower towards the
anchor) and the apparent shift may result from this difference of
‘erosion’. However, an equally plausible explanation is that the
training with the 3-points scales enlarged the central category thus
shifting the intermediate categories towards the extremities.
Further experiments are thus required to determine whether this
non-linearity is reproducible, and in this case, to determine its
causes.
Expected results
The categories (centers of mass of the distributions) were linearly
spaced as expected from the evidence on the rating curve [11].
Note that the non-linear position of the cores was invisible at the
level of the distribution. Whatever the cause of the phenomenon,
this shows conclusively than classical descriptive statistics do not
capture adequately consistency and objective certainty. The
peripheries presented a bow effect, i.e., they were wider towards
the center of the scale. This is compatible with the bow effects
reported in absolute identification for the reaction times, the
imprecision (rate of errors) and the dispersion of the ratings
[15,38]. However, in the case of certainty, the bow effect may have
a simpler explanation: namely that the periphery is one-sided for
the extreme categories and two-sided for central categories.
Individual vs. collective judgment
The cores were only observed on individual data. In group data,
they did not appear. The immediate consequence is that most of
the results discussed here would have been invisible on group data.
The mechanical explanation is that inter-individual differences
played the role of a ‘noise’ with an order of magnitude greater
than individual imprecision, i.e., all the stimuli had a different
rating at some point, thus the cores were void. It is worth
underlining that group data represent collective judgment, and it is
clear that the objective certainty of collective judgment requires a
smoother definition.
How noise affects the cores
There is an inverse relationship between noise and cores. In the
present case, the fist source of noise was perception (including the
variability of visual angle due to small head shifts). This type of
noise increases the probability of inconsistent judgments, thus it
tends to ‘erode’ the cores, given that the cores are regions of
absolute consistency. This effect mostly occurs at the frontiers (in the
center of a category, the rating remains the same even if the
perceived size fluctuates). A second source of noise may be random
erroneous judgments (e.g., selecting involuntarily the wrong
response). Such errors may occur in the middle of the categories
and as the number of stimuli increases they may scatter the cores.
The first symptom of scattering will be the presence of misclassified
elements (of the cores into the peripheries and/or vice-versa). In
the present case, we verified a posteriori that there was no trace of
scattering. However, other experimental setups may be more
‘noisy’, and the issue of noise should be dealt with.
Computing cores in presence of noise
For simplicity (or ‘methodological parsimony’) we suggest using
in the first place the basic definition of the cores and the simple
computation method presented here. If the data set shows traces of
scattering, more complex methods should be considered. In this
case, we suggest using a simple noise-resistant technique based on
a generalization of the original definition of the cores. Instead of 1-
cuts, the cores may be defined as a-cuts (i.e., relative frequencies
.=a are in the core), which provides tolerance to a given
proportion of random errors. Then, the threshold a may be
adjusted automatically to the data set, so that the resulting cores
Certainty Categorical Judgment
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adjustment of parameters is strongly recommended, because
manually-adjusted parameters decrease the significance of the
results, just like arbitrary assumptions decrease the significance of a
theory. Indeed, the field of signal processing offers a variety of
techniques to cancel noise, threshold adjustment being only one of
them. In any case, the important point is to assess the robustness of
the technique a posteriori on the actual data set, or a priori, e.g.,
by means of simulations on artificial data sets randomly generated
from preliminary data [47].
Fuzzy tools, but no fuzzy framework
Cores and peripheries are borrowed from the theory of fuzzy
sets, and they depict a geometry that is remarkably similar to the
ideal membership functions used in fuzzy paradigms [28,40].
However, in the present study, cores and peripheries were
determined within the classical statistical framework. We did not
assume the axiomatic of Fuzzy Sets or their canonical interpre-
tations in terms of typicality or possibility [24,29]. Also we did not
use Fuzzy Sets to model the internal structure of categories [16,41]
or to model perception and judgment processes [42,43]. Cores and
peripheries were used to describe schematically the data and were
by no means explanatory concepts. Although of considerable
interest, a fuzzy model of certainty was beyond the scope of this
study.
The internal structure of categories
The internal structure (or internal representation) of categories
is a useful construct to explain and/or describe the observations in
Categorization and Category Learning. There exist alternative
theories, e.g., prototype-based, exemplars-based, frontier-based,
rule-based [44,45]. However, a ubiquitous, theory-independent
observation is that categories are generally graded [46]. It is
tempting to link certainty with the internal structure of the
categories of the ratings, e.g., to identify certainty with the
typicality [16,26,27]. However, this would be unfounded.
Typicality and confidence (subjective certainty) are different
concepts, and in categorization tasks, both seem to participate in
the apparent gradedness (see discussion in [6]). A second obstacle is
that the internal structure is covert and difficult to extrapolate
from the literature, because it depends on the way categories were
defined to- and learned by- participants [44]. We thus preferred to
remain empirical, and we leave to others the challenge to establish
relationships between the internal structure of the categories of the
ratings and certainty.
Further studies on certainty in categorization and
judgment
The present study was primarily a proof of concept. It showed
that objective certainty can be documented experimentally. This
study revealed unexpected phenomena, i.e., ubiquitous presence of
cores, the shift of the cores towards the extremities of the scale, the
decrease of the cores along the scale. These phenomena provide a
complement to well-documented effects in the field of perceptual
judgment (perception noise, decision noise, bow and anchoring
effect, variation of resolution with stimulus intensity). However,
future experiments on certainty in categorization and judgment
have to account for the factors that affect the cores, like the
perceptual noise (e.g., the spacing of stimuli), information
processing limitations (number of ratings) or simply the factors
that were insufficiently controlled in the present study, like the
categories used in the preliminary training and the labels of the
scale.
Further studies on objective vs. subjective certainty
The paradigm of the present study was the objective certainty of
individual judgments, without any consideration of accuracy.
Previous works on confidence (i.e., subjective certainty), over- and
under-confidence have been conducted in relation with accuracy.
For instance in perception tasks, the common modality was
comparative judgment, for which accuracy is clearly defined [4].
However, confidence is to some extent independent of accuracy,
possibly related to domain knowledge independent of any specific
responses [48], to individual factors (but not with cognitive styles
[49]) and/or to the familiarity with stimuli [50]. The protocol
presented here suggests interesting possibilities for the comparison
of objective and subjective certainty (assessed by means of
questionnaires) without accuracy constraints, in a task that is free
from domain knowledge and that uses connotation-free stimuli.
This line of study may provide insights into the mutual
relationships between confidence, consistency of judgment and
the resultant objective certainty.
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